We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are di¤erent from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch's (Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming) notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set. We …rst investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks coincide with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks and the set of strongly e¢ cient networks. We then provide some primitive conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly e¢ cient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, the set of strongly e¢ cient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex.
Introduction
The organization of individual agents into networks and groups or coalitions plays an important role in the determination of the outcome of many social and economic interactions. For instance, networks of personal contacts are important in obtaining information on goods and services, like product information or information about job opportunities. Many commodities are traded through networks of buyers and sellers. A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run is to examine the requirement that individuals do not bene…t from altering the structure of the network. An example of such a condition is the pairwise stability notion de…ned by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . A network is pairwise stable if no individual bene…ts from severing one of her links and no two individuals bene…t from adding a link between them, with one bene…ting strictly and the other at least weakly. Pairwise stability is a myopic de…nition. Individuals are not forward-looking in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. For instance, the adding or severing of one link might lead to subsequent addition or severing of another link. If individuals have very good information about how others might react to changes in the network, then these are things one wants to allow for in the de…nition of the stability concept. For instance, a network could be stable because individuals might not add a link that appears valuable to them given the current network, as that might in turn lead to the formation of other links and ultimately lower the payo¤s of the original individuals. Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) have proposed the notion of pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks that predicts which networks one might expect to emerge in the long run when players are farsighted.
1 A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network g 2 G to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse o¤ or equally well o¤, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the set, 2 and (iii) if there is no proper subset 1 Jackson (2003 Jackson ( , 2005 provides surveys of models of network formation. Other approaches to farsightedness in network formation are suggested by the work of Chwe (1994) , Xue (1998) , Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2004) , Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) , Page, Wooders and Kamat (2005) , Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005) , and Page and Wooders (2009) . 2 A farsighted improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players form or sever links based on the improvement the end network o¤ers relative to the current network. Each pairwise (myopic) stability only sustains networks that are strongly ine¢ cient or even Pareto dominated.
Second, we provide some primitive conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly e¢ cient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. We …nd that, under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, the set of strongly e¢ cient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex. A value function is top convex if some strongly e¢ cient network also maximizes the per capita value among individuals.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations and basic properties and de…nitions for networks. In Section 3 we de…ne the notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks. In Section 4 we reconsider Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) symmetric connections model. In Section 5 we reconsider the bargaining model of Corominas-Bosch (2004) and the Kranton and Minehart (2001) model of buyer-seller networks. In Section 6 we look at the relationship between farsighted stability and e¢ ciency of networks. In Section 7 we conclude.
Networks
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be the …nite set of players who are connected in some network relationship. The network relationships are reciprocal and the network is thus modeled as a non-directed graph. Individuals are the nodes in the graph and links indicate bilateral relationships between individuals. Thus, a network g is simply a list of which pairs of individuals are linked to each other. We write ij 2 g to indicate that i and j are linked under the network g. Let g N be the collection of all subsets of N with cardinality 2, so g N is the complete network. The set of all possible networks or graphs on N is denoted by G and consists of all subsets of g N :
The network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g is denoted g + ij and the network that results from deleting link ij from an existing network g is denoted g ij. For any network g, let N (g) = fi j 9 j such that ij 2 gg be the set of players who have at least one link in the network g. A path in a network g 2 G between i and j is a sequence of players i 1 ; : : : ; i K such that i k i k+1 2 g for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g with i 1 = i and i K = j. A non-empty network h g is a component of g, if for all i 2 N (h) and j 2 N (h) n fig; there exists a path in h connecting i and j, and for any i 2 N (h) and j 2 N (g), ij 2 g implies ij 2 h. The set of components of g is denoted by C(g). Knowing the components of a network, we can partition the players into groups within which players are connected. Let (g) denote the partition of N induced by the network g.
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A value function is a function v : G ! R that keeps track of how the total societal value varies across di¤erent networks. The set of all possible value functions is denoted by V. An allocation rule is a function Y : G V ! R N that keeps track of how the value is allocated among the players forming a network. It satis…es Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) have proposed a number of basic properties of value functions and allocation rules. A value function is component additive if
Component additive value functions are the ones for which the value of a network is the sum of the value of its components. An allocation rule Y is component balanced if for any component additive v 2 V, g 2 G, and
Component balancedness only puts conditions on Y for v's that are component additive, so Y can be arbitrary otherwise.
Given a permutation of players and any g 2 G, let g = f (i) (j) j ij 2 gg. Thus, g is a network that is identical to g up to a permutation of the players. A value function is anonymous if for any permutation and any g 2 G, v(g ) = v(g).
Given a permutation , let v be de…ned by v (g) = v(g 1 ) for each g 2 G. An allocation rule Y is anonymous if for any v 2 V, g 2 G, and permutation , we have
An allocation rule that is component balanced and anonymous is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule. For a component additive v and network g, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce is such that for any h 2 C(g) and 
for all i with at least one strict inequality. A network g 2 G is
4 Throughout the paper we use the notation for weak inclusion and for strict inclusion.
Finally, # will refer to the notion of cardinality. A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run is to examine the requirement that agents do not bene…t from altering the structure of the network. A weak version of such a condition is the pairwise stability notion de…ned by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . A network is pairwise stable if no player bene…ts from severing one of her links and no two players bene…t from adding a link between them, with one bene…ting strictly and the other at least weakly. Formally, a network g is pairwise stable with respect to value function v and allocation rule Y if
, and
Pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks
A farsighted improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players form or sever links based on the improvement the end network o¤ers relative to the current network. Each network in the sequence di¤ers by one link from the previous one. If a link is added, then the two players involved must both prefer the end network to the current network, with at least one of the two strictly preferring the end network. If a link is deleted, then it must be that at least one of the two players involved in the link strictly prefers the end network. We now introduce the formal de…nition of a farsighted improving path.
De…nition 1. A farsighted improving path from a network g to a network g 0 6 = g is a …nite sequence of graphs g 1 ; : : : ; g K with g 1 = g and g K = g 0 such that for any k 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g either:
If there exists a farsighted improving path from g to g 0 , then we write g ! g 0 .
For a given network g, let F (g) = fg 0 2 G j g ! g 0 g. This is the set of networks that can be reached by a farsighted improving path from g. Thus, g ! g 0 means that g 0 is the endpoint of at least one farsighted improving path from g: Notice that F (g) may contain many networks and that a network g 0 2 F (g) might be the endpoint of several farsighted improving paths starting in g.
We now introduce a solution concept due to Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) , the pairwise farsightedly stable set.
De…nition 2. A set of networks G G is pairwise farsightedly stable with respect 
The symmetric connections model
In Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) symmetric connections model, players form links with each other in order to exchange information. If player i is connected to player j by a path of t links, then player i receives a payo¤ of t from her indirect connection with player j. It is assumed that 0 < < 1, and so the payo¤ t decreases as the path connecting players i and j increases; thus information that travels a long distance becomes diluted and is less valuable than information obtained from a closer neighbor. Each direct link ij results in a cost c to both i and j. This cost can be interpreted as the time a player must spend with another player in order to maintain a direct link. Player i's payo¤ from a network g is given by
where t(ij) is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j (setting t(ij) = 1 if there is no path between i and j). Let g denote a star network encompassing everyone and g ? be the empty network (no links).
Proposition 1 (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) . Take the symmetric connections model. The unique strongly e¢ cient network is (i) the complete network g N if c <
(1 ), (ii) a star encompassing everyone if (1 ) < c < + ((n 2)=2) 2 , and (iii) the empty network if + ((n 2)=2) 2 < c.
Proposition 2 (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) . Take the symmetric connections model. For c < (1 ), the unique pairwise stable network is the complete network g N . For (1 ) < c < , a star encompassing all players is pairwise stable, but not necessarily the unique pairwise stable network. For < c, any pairwise stable network which is non-empty is such that each player has at least two links and thus is ine¢ cient.
These two results show that there is a con ‡ict between e¢ ciency and pairwise stability for a large range of the parameters. Indeed, only for c < (1 ), there is no con ‡ict between the e¢ cient and the pairwise stable networks. When (1 ) < c < , the e¢ cient network is pairwise stable, but there are other pairwise stable networks that are not e¢ cient. For < c < + ((n 2)=2) 2 , the e¢ cient network is never pairwise stable. And, …nally, for + ((n 2)=2) 2 < c, the e¢ cient network is pairwise stable, but there could be other pairwise stable networks that are not e¢ cient.
Proposition 3. Take the symmetric connections model.
, a set consisting of the complete network, fg N g, is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
(ii) For (1 ) < c < , every set consisting of a star network encompassing all players, fg g, is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks, but they are not necessarily the unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
(iii) For c > , a set consisting of the empty network, fg ? g, is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if c > + ((n 2)=2) 2 . Otherwise, if < c < + ((n 2)=2) 2 , fg ? g is not necessarily the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Proof.
Thus, any two players who are not directly connected bene…t from forming a link. In this case, the complete network g N strictly Pareto dominates all other networks. That is, for every g 2 G n g N we have that, for all i,
Theorem 7 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) states that if there is a network g that strictly Pareto dominates all other networks, then fgg is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Hence, we have that fg N g is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
(ii) Assume (1 ) < c < . Since 2 > ( c), and 2 > 3 > ::: > n 1 , each player prefers an indirect link at a distance of two to any direct link and to any indirect link at a distance greater than two. In a star network encompassing all players g there is n 1 links connecting one given player i to any other player j 2 N , j 6 = i. Denote i(g ) the hub player at the star g . The payo¤ of the hub player i(g ) is Y i (g ) = (n 1)( c) and the payo¤ of any spoke
Notice that the payo¤ of the spoke players is the maximum payo¤ a player can get in any network g 2 G.
Using Theorem 4 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) which says that the set fgg is a pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if for every g 0 2 G n fgg we have g 2 F (g 0 ), we will prove that every set consisting of a star network encompassing all players fg g is a pairwise farsightedly stable set since g 2 F (g) for any g 6 = g .
(ii.a) Consider …rst any network g containing at most n 1 links. Starting from the empty network g ? , it is straightforward to construct a farsightedly improving path leading to g so that g 2 F (g ? ). Take the hub player i and any other player and form the link between them. Then, add successively the links between the hub player and any other player until g is formed. Starting from any other network g with k n 1 links, if g is another star (g 6 = g ) encompassing all players, let the hub player at g, i(g), delete a link. Otherwise, if g is not a star encompassing all players, let any linked player j 6 = i(g ) delete one link. In the next steps, any linked player di¤erent than i(g ) cuts one link until the empty network g ? is reached. From g ? , add successively the links between player i(g ) and the rest of the players until g is formed. Obviously, g 2 F (g) because every deviating player prefers g to the network they were facing before deviating in order to end up at g .
(ii.b) Consider next any network g containing more than n 1 links. In such network g, there is always at least a player j 6 = i(g ) with more than one direct link and that would like to move to g . From g, let one of such players delete one of her links. If the resulting network has still more than n 1 links, choose again a player l 6 = i(g ) with more than one direct link and let her delete one link. The process continue until we reach at some point a network g 0 with n 1 links. If (ii.c) It is straightforward to verify that, for n = 4, sets consisting of a star network encompassing all players are not the unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
For instance, if (1 2 ) < c < , a set consisting of all lines where players get identical payo¤s is a pairwise farsightedly stable set. If (1 ) < c <
(1 2 ), a set consisting of all circles is a pairwise farsightedly stable set.
(iii.a) Assume …rst that c > + ((n 2)=2) 2 . In order to show that a set consisting of the empty network (with a payo¤ of 0 for all players) is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks, we need to show that Corollary 1 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) applies. That is, we need to show that
the empty network g ? is the unique strongly e¢ cient network. This implies that in any other network g, there is some player with a negative payo¤ that prefers the empty network and hence, we have that g = 2 F (g ? ). Now, from g, let one of the players with a negative payo¤ delete one of her links. Since in any resulting network g 0 there is some player preferring the empty network, by letting one of such players deleting one of her links at each step, we …nally end up at the empty network g ? , and g ? 2 F (g). Thus, g ? 2 F (g) for all g 6 = g (iii.b) Assume now that < c < + ((n 2)=2) 2 . In this case, the empty network is no more the strongly e¢ cient network (a star encompassing everyone is the strongly e¢ cient network). However, there are still some parameter values for which a set consisting of the empty network, fg ? g, is a pairwise farsightedly stable set. Indeed, the necessary and su¢ cient condition in order to have that
. That is, in every g 6 = g ? , there should be a player with a negative payo¤ that would like to move to g ? (and then notice that every g 6 = g ? is such that g = 2 F (g ? )).
From any g 6 = g ? , let at each step one of the players obtaining a negative payo¤ delete one of her links until g ? is reached. Proposition 3 shows that replacing myopic by farsighted players in the symmetric connections model does not eliminate the con ‡ict between strong e¢ ciency and stability but, sometimes, it may help to reduce it. For instance, when +((n 2)=2) 2 < c, a set consisting of the unique strongly e¢ cient network is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set while other networks may be pairwise stable. Regarding the relationship between pairwise stability and pairwise farsighted stability, we observe that the concept of pairwise stability is quite robust to the introduction of farsighted players because, for a large range of parameters, we have that pairwise stable networks belong to pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
Watts (2001) has analyzed the process of network formation in a dynamic framework where pairs of myopic players meet and decide whether or not to form or sever links with each other based on the improvement the resulting network o¤ers relative to the current network. If the bene…t from maintaining an indirect link is greater than the net bene…t from maintaining a direct link (case (ii) of Proposition 3), then it is di¢ cult for the strongly e¢ cient network (which is the star network) to form.
In fact, starting at the empty network, the strongly e¢ cient network only forms if the order in which the players meet takes a particular pattern. Moreover, as the number of players increases it becomes less likely that the strongly e¢ cient network forms. These results contrast with ours, for such parameter values, since every set consisting of a star network is a pairwise farsightedly stable set whatever the number of farsighted players. Thus, it is not unlikely that forward looking players will increase the chances of the star forming.
5 Buyer-seller networks Corominas-Bosch (2004) has developed a simple model of trading networks with bilateral bargaining. The market consists of s sellers 1; 2; :::; s and b buyers s + 1; s + 2; :::; s + b. We denote the set of buyers as B and the set of sellers as S. Each seller owns a single object to sell that has no value to the seller. Buyers have a valuation of 1 for an object and do not care from whom they purchase the good. If a seller and a buyer trade at price p, the seller receives a payo¤ of p and the buyer a payo¤ of 1 p. Agents are embedded in a network that links sellers and buyers, and trade is only possible among linked agents. That is, a link in the network represents the opportunity for a buyer and a seller to bargain and potentially exchange an object.
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Let G(S; B) = fg 2 G j ij 2 g , i 2 S and j 2 Bg be the set of feasible buyer-seller networks. Agents incur a cost of maintaining each link equal to c s for sellers and to c b for buyers. So the payo¤ to an agent is her payo¤ from any trade on the network, less the cost of maintaining any links that she is involved with.
In the …rst period sellers simultaneously call out prices. A buyer can only select from the prices that she has heard called out by the sellers to whom she is The protocol is essentially designed to maximize the number of transactions.
as payo¤s, and buyers receive 0); those in which the collective set of sellers is linked to the same-sized collective set of buyers (each receives 1=2); and those in which sellers outnumber buyers (sellers receive 0, and buyers get 1). Let G 2 be the set of all buyer-seller networks consisting of pairs and so that the maximum number of potential pairs must form. That is, G 2 = fg 2 G(S; B) j l(g) = minf#S; #Bg and l i (g) 1 8i 2 S [ Bg where l(g) is the number of links in g and l i (g) is the number of links player i has in g.
Proposition 4 (Jackson, 2003) . In the Corominas-Bosch model with 1=2 > c s > 0 and 1=2 > c b > 0, the set of pairwise stable networks is G 2 which is exactly the set of strongly e¢ cient networks.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. An agent having a payo¤ of 0 cannot have any links since by deleting a link she could save the link cost and not lose any bene…t. So, all agents who have links must obtain payo¤s of 1=2 (ignoring 8 The algorithm works as follows.
Step 1a: Identify groups of two or more sellers who are all linked only to the same buyer. Regardless of that buyer's other connections, eliminate that set of sellers and buyer (with the buyer obtaining 1 and the sellers receiving 0).
Step 1b: On the remaining network, repeat step 1a but with the role of buyers and sellers reversed.
Step k: Proceed inductively in k, each time identifying subsets of at least k sellers who are collectively linked to some set of fewer-than-k buyers, or some collection of at least k buyers who are collectively linked to some set of fewer-than-k sellers. End: When all such subgraphs are removed, the buyers and sellers in the remaining network are such that every subset of sellers is linked to at least as many buyers and vice versa, and the buyers and sellers in that subnetwork get 1=2.
the costs of maintaining links). Then, we can show that if there are extra links in such a network relative to the strongly e¢ cient network which consists of a maximal number of disjoint linked pairs, some links could be deleted without changing the payo¤s from trade but saving link costs. Thus, a pairwise stable network must consist of linked pairs, and the maximum number of potential pairs must form.
Notice that if 1=2 < c s and/or 1=2 < c b then the empty network is the unique pairwise stable network. The empty network is strongly e¢ cient only if c s + c b 1.
Let B = f e B B j # e B = minf#S; #Bgg and S = f e S S j # e S = minf#S; #Bgg. Given e B 2 B and e S 2 S, let G 2 ( e B; e S) = fg 2 G(S; B) j l(g) = minf#S; #Bg, l i (g) = 1 8i 2 e S [ e B, and l i (g) = 0 8i = 2 e S [ e Bg. Of course,
Proposition 5. In the Corominas-Bosch model with 1=2 > c s > 0 and 1=2 > c b > 0,
for all e B 2 B and e S 2 S, the set G 2 ( e B; e S) is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks.
Proof. Take any e B 2 B and e S 2 S. First, we show that for every
there is g 2 G 2 ( e B; e S) such that g 2 F (g 0 ). Notice that, for every g 2 G 2 ( e B; e S), each agent receives either Y i (g) = 1=2 c i > 0 if agent i is linked to another agent or Y i (g) = 0 if agent i has no link, and
for all i 2 N . Start with g 0 and build a sequence of networks where at each step some agent (who is looking forward to g) deletes a link until we reach a network g 00 consisting only of linked pairs of agents and/or agents having no links. Then, agents successively add the links that belong to g but do not belong to g 00 . Finally, at each following step some agent who has two links at the current network, one link with her partner in g and one link with another partner, deletes the latter link until we reach the network g.
Step 1a: Agents who receive a payo¤ strictly less than 0 successively delete a link. Each agent is willing to delete a link looking forward to g since
Step 1b: On the remaining network, delete a link from an agent who receives a payo¤ of 1=2 l i c i with l i > 1 and who obtains a payo¤ of 1=2 c i at the endpoint g.
Step k: Proceed inductively in k, agents who receive a payo¤ strictly less than 0 successively delete a link; then, on the remaining network, delete a link from an agent who receives a payo¤ of 1=2 l i c i with l i > 1 and who obtains a payo¤ of 1=2 c i at the endpoint g.
Step K: When all such links are removed, we end up at a network g 00 2 fg 2 G(S; B) j l(g) minf#S; #Bg and l i (g) 1 8i 2 S [ Bg where all the buyers and sellers in g 00 that do have a link get a payo¤ of 1=2 c i while the others get 0. If g 00 2 G 2 ( e B; e S) we stop here. Otherwise, select g 2 G 2 ( e B; e S)
such that g \ g 00 e g \ g 00 for all e g 2 G 2 ( e B; e S).
Step K + 1: Agents successively add the links that belong to g but do not belong to g 00 . That is, a pair of agents i and j will add the link ij so that ij 2 g and ij = 2 g 00 . Since at least one of the agent has no link at g 00 , say agent i (l i (g 00 ) = 0), then Y i (g 00 ) = 0 < Y i (g) = 1=2 c i , and so agent i is willing to add the link. The other agent (agent j) has either no link (which gives her a payo¤ of 0) or has one link (which gives her a payo¤ of 1=2 c j )
and so she agrees to add the link with agent i since Y j (g 00 ) Y j (g). When all such links are added, we end up at a network g 000 .
Step K + 2: Agents that have a link in g 00 but do not have a link in g are linked in g 000 to some agent who has two links in g 000 and so obtain a payo¤ of 0 c i . Those agents successively delete their links looking forward to g. When all such links are removed, we end up at the network g.
Second, we show that for every g 2 G 2 ( e B; e S) we have that F (g) \ G 2 ( e B; e S) = ?.
e S) and for all i 2 S [ B, it follows that
Theorem 3 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) states that if for every g 0 2 G n G we have F (g 0 ) \ G 6 = ; and for every g 2 G; F (g) \ G = ;, then G is a pairwise farsightedly stable set. Hence, we have that G 2 ( e B; e S) is a pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Proposition 6. In the Corominas-Bosch model with 1=2 > c s > 0 and 1=2 > c b > 0, there does not exist a pairwise farsightedly stable set G such that G \ G 2 = ?.
Proof. We will show that for all g 0 = 2 G 2 and for all g 2 G 2 we have that g 0 = 2 F (g) which guarantees that there does not exist a pairwise farsightedly stable set G such that G \ G 2 = ?. The only networks g 0 = 2 G 2 that some forward looking agents may prefer to g 2 G 2 are such that the agents deviating from g obtain a payo¤ of 1 in g 0 (ignoring the costs of maintaining links). To obtain 1 the deviating agents will have to form links along the sequence with agents that will obtain 0 in g 0 (ignoring the costs of maintaining links). But, before forming these additional links with the original deviating agents, these agents have a payo¤ of either 1=2 or 0 (ignoring the costs of maintaining links), and thus, they have incentives to block the formation of any additional costly link.
In the bargaining model of Corominas-Bosch (2004) > c b and/or l s 6 = l b then fgg with g 2 G 1 = fg 2 G(f1g; B) j l(g) = minfl s ; l b gg are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
G(f1g; B) j l(g) = l s 1g are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
Proof. (i) Suppose
> c s and/or
> c b and/or l s 6 = l b ; and let
Then, it follows that fgg with g 2 G 1 are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
(ii) Suppose (a) and (b) imply that G 1 [ fg 00 g with g 00 2 G 1 is a pairwise farsightedly stable set while (c) implies that G 1 [ fg 00 g with g 00 2 G 1 are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
While the pairwise (myopically or farsightedly) stable networks may not be strongly e¢ cient, they are Pareto e¢ cient. However, when there are more sellers it is possible for non-trivial pairwise (myopically) stable networks to be Pareto ine¢ cient. Consider a population with two sellers and four buyers. Let agents 1 and 2 be the sellers and 3, 4, 5 and 6 be the buyers. Some straightforward but tedious calculations lead to the payo¤s which are given in Figure 3 and Figure 4 for selected networks. For instance, when c s = 5=60 and c b = 1=60, there are three types of pairwise stable networks: the empty network, networks that look like f13; 14; 15; 16g, and networks that look like f13; 14; 15; 24; 25; 26g. Both the empty network and f13; 14; 15; 24; 25; 26g are not Pareto e¢ cient, while f13; 14; 15; 16g is. The empty network and the network f13; 14; 15; 24; 25; 26g are Pareto dominated by the network f13; 14; 25; 26g. In addition, the network f13; 14; 15; 16g is not strongly e¢ cient. The network f13; 14; 25; 26g is strongly e¢ cient but is not pairwise stable since agents 1 and 5 have incentives to add a link. However, the network f13; 14; 25; 26g is pairwise farsightedly stable. Indeed, we have that
is a pairwise farsightedly stable set since for 6 Farsighted stability and e¢ ciency 6.1 Primitive conditions on value functions Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) have shown that the set of pairwise farsightedly stable networks and the set of strongly e¢ cient networks, those which are socially optimal, may be disjoint for all allocation rules that are component balanced and anonymous. However, as already mentioned, if there is a network g that strictly Pareto dominates all other networks, then fgg is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Suppose that Y is the egalitarian allocation rule and E(v) is the set of strongly e¢ cient networks. Then, E(v) is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
We now provide some alternative primitive conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly e¢ cient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. It will turn out that under the conditions we will impose the notion of pairwise farsighted stability re…nes the notion of pairwise stability by eliminating the ine¢ cient pairwise stable networks.
A value function v is top convex if some strongly e¢ cient network also maximizes the per capita value among players. Let g S be the collection of all subsets of S N with cardinality 2. 
Using Theorem 5 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) which says that G is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if G = fg 2 G j F (g) = ?g and for every g 0 2 G n G, F (g 0 ) \ G 6 = ?, we have that E(v) is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
()) Since E(v) is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set, we have F (g) = ?
for all g 2 E(v). It follows that under the componentwise egalitarian allocation
for all i; j 2 N and for all 
Strict or weak deviations
It is customary to require that a pair of players will deviate only if one player is made better o¤ and the other one at least equal o¤ at the end network. In many situations it should not be too di¢ cult for the player who is better at the end network to convince the indi¤erent player to join her to move towards this end network. For instance, when small transfers between the deviating pair are allowed. The notion of farsighted improving path given in De…nition 1 captures this idea. But sometimes a pair of players will deviate only if both are made better o¤ at the end network, since changing the status-quo is costly, and players have to be compensated for doing so.
The notion of strict farsighted improving path captures this idea. Let us introduce now a notion of pairwise farsighted stability that only accounts for deviations that make all players strictly better o¤. De…nition 3. A strict farsighted improving path from a network g to a network g 0 6 = g is a …nite sequence of networks g 1 ; : : : ; g K with g 1 = g and g K = g 0 such that for any k 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g either:
For a given network g, let F s (g) be the set of networks that can be reached by a strict farsighted improving path from g. We have that F s (g) F (g). We now introduce the concept of strict pairwise farsightedly stable set based on the notion of strict improving path.
De…nition 4. A set of networks G G is a strict pairwise farsightedly stable set with respect v and Y if
and (ii).
It is straightforward that if fgg is a strict pairwise farsightedly stable set then fgg is a pairwise farsightedly stable set. The reverse is not true. However, if G is a pairwise farsightedly stable set then (i) @ G 0 G such that G 0 is a strict pairwise farsightedly stable set, (ii) @ G 0 G such that G 0 is a strict pairwise farsightedly stable set as the following example shows.
Consider a situation with three players where the payo¤s are given in Figure 5 . It can be veri…ed that F (g 0 ) = fg 1 ; g 3 ; g 7 g, F (g 1 ) = fg 0 g, F (g 2 ) = fg 0 ; g 1 ; g 7 g, F (g 3 ) = fg 1 ; g 6 ; g 7 g, F (g 4 ) = fg 0 ; g 1 ; g 7 g, F (g 5 ) = fg 1 ; g 3 ; g 6 ; g 7 g, F (g 6 ) = fg 1 ; g 7 g, and F (g 7 ) = fg 6 g. Hence, the pairwise farsightedly stable sets are fg 0 ; g 7 g, fg 0 ; g 3 ; g 6 g, fg 1 ; g 6 g, fg 1 ; g 7 g. It can also be veri…ed that
fg 6 g. Hence, the unique strict pairwise farsightedly stable sets is fg 0 ; g 3 ; g 6 g, and strict pairwise farsighted stability re…nes (weak) pairwise farsighted stability. Consider another situation with three players where the payo¤s are given in Figure 6. It can be veri…ed that F (g 0 ) = fg 1 ; g 3 ; g 7 g, F (g 1 ) = fg 0 g, F (g 2 ) = fg 0 ; g 1 ; g 7 g, F (g 3 ) = fg 1 ; g 7 g, F (g 4 ) = fg 0 ; g 1 ; g 7 g, F (g 5 ) = fg 1 ; g 3 ; g 4 ; g 7 g, F (g 6 ) = fg 1 ; g 7 g, and F (g 7 ) = fg 4 g. The pairwise farsightedly stable sets are fg 0 ; g 7 g, fg 0 ; g 3 ; g 4 ; g 6 g, fg 1 ; g 4 g, fg 1 ; g 7 g. It can also be veri…ed that
and F s (g 7 ) = fg 4 g. Hence, the strict pairwise farsightedly stable sets are fg 0 ; g 3 ; g 7 g, fg 0 ; g 3 ; g 4 ; g 6 g, fg 0 ; g 1 ; g 3 ; g 4 g. Thus, in general, there are no relationships between strict pairwise farsighted stability and (weak) pairwise farsighted stability.
be the network with the highest per capita value out of those that can be formed by players in S N . Given a component additive value function v, …nd a network g v through the following algorithm. Pick some h 1 2 g(v; N ). Next, pick some
N is …nite this process stops after a …nite number K of stages. The union of the components picked in this way de…nes a network g v . We denote by G v the set of all networks that can be found through this algorithm. 12 More than one network may be picked up through this algorithm since players may be permuted or even be indi¤erent between components of di¤erent sizes. forward will never engage in a move since they can never be strictly better o¤ than in g given the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce . Players belonging to N (h 2 ) in g who are forward looking will never engage in a move since the only possibility to obtain a strictly higher payo¤ is to end up in h 1 (if h 1 gives a strictly higher payo¤ than h 2 ) but players belonging to N (h 1 ) will never engage a move. So, players belonging to N (h 2 ) can never end up strictly better o¤ than in g given the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce . Players belonging to N (h k ) in g who are forward looking will never engage in a move since the only possibility to obtain a strictly higher payo¤ is to end up in h 1 or h 2 ... or h k 1 but players belonging to From g 0 , let the players who belong to N (h 1 ) in g and are looking forward to g …rst deleting successively all their links and then building successively the links in h 1 (leading to g 00 = g 0 fij j i 2 N (h 1 )g + h 1 ). Along the sequence from g 0 to g 00 all players who are moving always strictly prefer the end network g to the current network. Once g 00 (and h 1 ) is formed, all the remaining players who are belonging to N n N (h 1 ) in g 00 are strictly worse o¤ than the players belonging to N (h 2 ) in g.
From g 00 , let the players who belong to N (h 2 ) in g and who are looking forward to g …rst deleting successively all their links and then building successively the links in h 2 (leading to g 000 = g 0 fij j i 2 N (h 1 ) [ N (h 2 )g + h 1 + h 2 ); and so on until we reach the network g. Thus, we have build a strict farsighted improving path from g 0 to g; g 2 F s (g 0 ).
Using Theorem 5 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) Finally, consider a situation with …ve players where the payo¤s to players in networks of the type g e = f12; 23; 45g are Y 1 (g e ) = Y 2 (g e ) = Y 3 (g e ) = 10, Y 4 (g e ) =
Y 5 (g e ) = 5 while in all other networks payo¤s are equal to zero. The set of strongly e¢ cient networks consists of networks of the type g e and is the unique strict pairwise farsightedly stable set. However, v does not satisfy top convexity. Thus, under the notion of strict pairwise farsighted stability, top convexity is not necessary to sustain the set of strongly e¢ cient networks as the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
13 Jackson (2005) has proposed an alternative algorithm which is a bit di¤erent since it requires to pick the maximal number of links in the de…nition of each h k . Under a component additive v, a network de…ned by Jackson's algorithm is pairwise stable and Pareto e¢ cient under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce .
Conclusion
We have studied the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we have …rst examined whether the networks formed by farsighted players are di¤erent from those formed by myopic players in Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996) symmetric connections model, in Corominas-Bosch's (2004) model of trading networks with bilateral bargaining, and in Kranton and Minehart's (2001) model of buyer-seller networks. We have then provided some primitive conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly e¢ cient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, the set of strongly e¢ cient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex.
